Before the rule of the caretaker government over Kabul, former officials could have been considered as a minor part of the problem after the Doha agreement, because a fragmented administration remained, which only had control over the cities. It was possible to involve them in the partial aspects of the problem through intra-Afghan negotiations.
But since the former officials were initially considered and used as tools for the permanent presence and occupation of the U.S. in Afghanistan, the U.S. could no longer continue its presence in Afghanistan in any way. Therefore, the former officials also created a power vacuum in Kabul and moved away from the partial aspects of the issue.
These former officials have once again attempted to position themselves as a party in Afghanistan’s crisis, despite not having control over even a small piece of land, and living as refugees abroad. Their past is not so commendable that foreigners would want to involve them again in Afghanistan’s issues, as their deep involvement in widespread administrative corruption makes foreigners reluctant to invest in them once more.
Former officials can no longer represent the people, pretending to be their representatives, because they can be divided into two groups: one consists of former warlords whose hands are stained with the blood of innocent civilians, and the other group consists of foreign agents and those who promote foreign interests and ideologies. The people are sensitive to both groups and hate them.
The rightful claim of the caretaker government and its numerous connections and ties with the people have also led to former officials being rendered ineffective, and the resolution of the issue being left to impartial Afghans instead of them.
The internal conflicts among former officials, mutual distrust, and lack of cohesion have caused them to lose their influence both domestically and internationally. Foreigners also do not trust them, considering that they were tested during the civil wars and the previous government, and even the United States could not control them. Therefore, they cannot be considered as parties in the conflicts or as effective figures in solving Afghanistan’s problems.
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